Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool that holds producers financially responsible for the post-use collection, recycling and disposal of their products. EPR implementations are typically collective -a large collection and recycling network (CRN) handles multiple producers' products in order to benefit from scale and scope economies. The total cost is then allocated to producers based on metrics such as their return shares by weight. Such weight-based proportional allocation mechanisms do not consider the synergies inherent in resource sharing in CRNs, and are often criticized in practice for not taking into account the heterogeneity in the costs imposed by different producers' products. The consequence is cost allocations that impose higher costs on certain producer groups than they should be accountable for. This may lead some producers to break away from existing collective systems, resulting in fragmented systems with higher total cost. Yet cost efficiency is a key legislative and producer concern. To address this concern, this paper develops cost allocation mechanisms that induce system-wide participation in the collective system and maximize cost efficiency. The cost allocations we propose are presented as adjustments to the widely-used return share method, and include the weighing of return shares based on processing costs and the rewarding of valuable capacity contributions to the collective system. We validate our theoretical results using Washington state EPR implementation data and provide insights as to how these mechanisms can be implemented in practice and the added economic value to be obtained by their implementation.
Introduction
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool that holds producers financially responsible for the post-use collection, transportation and processing (i.e., dismantling, shredding and/or recycling) of their products (Lifset 1993 , Lindhqvist 2000 . Following its adoption in Europe 2 Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. through the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive (EU 2003) , EPR has rapidly become the main policy tool used in the U.S. for managing electronic waste ("e-waste"); twenty five states have passed e-waste bills, and legislation is pending in several other states (Electronics TakeBack Coalition 2011). EPR is now being adopted for other product categories as well (Product Stewardship Institute 2012) .
Since the proper handling of e-waste is typically costly, EPR introduces a significant economic burden on the electronics industry, the main stakeholder group affected by EPR. The desire to minimize this cost burden has resulted in the prevalence of collective implementations, which are believed to "offer the simplest, most straightforward, and most cost-effective approach" (WEEE Forum 2012) . In a collective system, a system operator (state-or producer-run) manages a large scale collection and recycling network (CRN) with many origins (waste collection points) and destinations (processors). The CRN collects, transports and processes a mixture of electronic waste consisting of many different product types originally sold by producers participating in that collective system. Such implementations not only allow for the exploitation of scale economies from consolidating waste volumes, but also capitalize on the synergies that arise from integrating and sharing available collection, transportation and recycling capacities, which we call the network synergies. Moreover, a collective implementation can reduce compliance monitoring costs. It can also encourage competition among service providers (collectors, transporters and processors) by employing competitive contracting (Lorch 2010 , WEEE Forum 2012 , further increasing cost efficiency.
An important consideration in operating a collective system is the allocation of the total cost among participating producers, as it directly impacts producers' willingness to stay in that collective system. Typically, the system operator allocates the total cost to participating producers by return share or market share, i.e., in proportion to their shares (by weight) in the total e-waste volume returned or sold. Such simple weight-based allocation mechanisms do not differentiate between producers even if they impose heterogeneous costs on the system. Thus, producers whose products incur lower transportation or processing costs can find that they are charged more in a collective system than their potential stand alone cost. For example, at a time when a cell phone could be recycled at a profit of about $0.50 (Geyer and Doctori Blass 2010) , cell phone producers in Europe were charged 0.03 Euros (approximately $0.05) by collective recycling systems (ERP France 2009).
Another drawback of return/market share is that they do not take into account the heterogeneous contributions of different producers to network synergies. A simple example illustrates this.
Consider two producers A and B who have products π A and π B , respectively, with return volumes of two and one. They have individual processing resources r A and r B , respectively, with capacity equal to their own return volumes. Let c = $4. In this case, if these producers independently operate (i.e., using only their own individual resources), they incur a cost of $2 and $4, respectively, for a total of $6. If they form a collective system, routing each product to the other producer's facility to exploit the network synergy yields a total cost of $5. However, under cost allocation by return share, producer A would pay $3.3 and would be worse off relative to its independent operating cost, despite contributing efficient processing capacity at r A . Given the existence of producer owned or contracted capacities in practice (e.g., HP's recycling facility in California (HP 2012) and backhaul miles available to producers through their delivery networks), the situation demonstrated is an important practical concern.
These problems associated with weight-based proportional allocations have resulted in significant producer concern. In the E.U., some producers have left or stated their interest in leaving existing collective systems and establishing their own networks (Shao and Lee 2009, IPR Works 2012) . Similar action is taking place in the U.S. as well. In Washington, two independent system proposals were filed in 2009 by two separate producer groups who believed their stand-alone costs would be lower than their cost allocation under the collective system run by the Washington Materials Management and Financing Authority (WMMFA). While these proposals were declined on compliance grounds, such efforts are continuing (Electronic Manufacturers Recycling Management Company 2011) and the emergence of independent systems operating in parallel with the default collective system is a real possibility. In Oregon, three producer groups have already chosen not to participate in the state's default collective system. System fragmentation, unless explicitly barred 1 , can result in recycling operations that are economically inefficient. Yet cost efficiency is a key concern from both legislative and producer perspectives. For example, in the E.U., a key consideration in WEEE legislation is cost efficiency (Huisman et al. 2007) . Similarly, recycling systems that are directly operated by producers, such as the European Recycling Platform, aim to ensure cost-effective implementation of the WEEE Directive (European Recycling Platform 2012). In the Washington state implementation in the U.S., WMMFA, which is a producer board-directed state authority, aims to operate "in the most cost-effective manner" (WMMFA 2012).
Hence, motivating the voluntary participation of producers in collective implementations is an important concern and requires alternative approaches to cost allocation. What these approaches should be has elicited much debate among producers and policy makers (Dempsey et al. 2010 , IPR Working Group 2012 and has led to specific suggestions. For instance, Mayers et al. (2012) interpreted cost allocation in collective systems as an accounting problem and proposed ad hoc
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Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. 5 contribution to network synergies. As our analysis will show, the core contains allocations that have these properties.
We study the cost allocation design problem using a cooperative network flow game with shared collection, transportation and processing capacities. We show that the cost allocation by return share is typically not group incentive compatible when there is cost and capacity heterogeneity in the system except under restrictive conditions regarding the relationship between the two factors.
We demonstrate that two types of adjustments to return share can greatly reduce or eliminate its incentive compatibility gap (the cost increase experienced by producers in the collective system compared to their stand-alone costs): (i) making capacity-based side payments to producers who provide access to resources that can handle (collect, transport and process) e-waste more cost effectively; and (ii) adjusting/weighing return shares to reflect the processing cost differentials between products or the use of critical resources (i.e., highly-utilized, low-cost resources) in the network. These adjustments provide succinct and intuitive ways of capturing network synergies while remaining true to the return share concept.
In addition, we address three important issues. (i) Economies of scale is one of the main reasons why producers and policy makers argue for collective systems. An analysis of the implications of economies of scale, however, uncovers a surprisingly negative side-effect: Under proportional cost allocations that are not group incentive compatible (e.g., return share), scale economies may increase the incentive compatibility gap and introduce a stronger incentive for producers to break away. In particular, this can happen when products that generate revenues from processing are handled in the same network as those that impose costs.
(ii) Some EPR bills mandate a penalty for producers who operate their own collection and recycling networks but do not fulfill their obligation.
We show how the adjustments we propose can be implemented to operationalize this concept while ensuring a group incentive compatible allocation. (iii) An implementation requirement for the proposed adjustments is information on the operational costs and volumes of each producer's e-waste flows, which can be obtained by separating waste at the collection stage. While costly, the value that can be obtained from doing so (i.e., inducing industry-wide participation in the collective system to maximize cost efficiency) can justify the associated costs. Identifying conditions under which the cost efficiency benefits of such information are realized is another practical contribution of our work.
To show how our results would translate into practice, we develop a sample network and a representative cost structure based on the Washington state implementation. A set of numerical experiments illustrate the concepts developed in the paper and yield insights regarding their implementation. We observe that the incentive compatibility gap of the allocation by return share, and the associated efficiency loss from fragmentation, can be substantial. Economies of scale is shown 6
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to reduce the incentive compatibility gap of return share (without guaranteeing a core allocation), while greatly accentuating efficiency loss from fragmentation. We demonstrate that the economic implications of legislative targets are strongly influenced by network synergies.
In sum, this paper provides value at three levels: It identifies the operational-level factors that cause return share to be an ineffective mechanism in ensuring the voluntary participation of producers, and resolves the problem by providing simple implementable adjustments. It provides system operators new directions in how to manage cost allocation in collective systems and guidance to producers as to what to lobby for vis-a-vis the legislature. Finally, it informs policy makers and producer responsibility organizations about the implications of key legislative choices in EPR bills.
Contribution to the Literature
A stream of research in the environmental economics literature studies the economics of regulated collection and recycling of post-consumer products (Palmer et al. 1997 , Palmer and Walls 1997 , Fullerton and Wu 1998 , Palmer and Walls 1999 , Walls and Palmer 2001 , Calcott and Walls 2000 , Walls 2003 , 2006 . These papers use stylized economic models to identify the optimal form of environmental legislation that maximizes social welfare. The main finding in this stream of literature is that a deposit-refund policy maximizes social welfare. Yet, the practice of e-waste legislation around the globe has converged to EPR implementations with mandated collection and recycling level targets imposed on producers. The recent operations management literature recognizes that implementing EPR is essentially an operational problem, and investigates how the principles of EPR can be effectively translated into working systems (e.g., Toyasaki et al. 2009 , Plambeck and Wang 2009 , Atasu et al. 2009 ), but using stylized models of operational decisions that do not capture network synergies. Our work contributes to this growing literature by explicitly capturing the network synergies in a CRN, without which group incentive compatible cost allocations cannot be designed.
Another relevant stream in the operations literature (Fleischmann et al. 2001 , Jayaraman et al. 2003 , Wojanowski et al. 2007 , Biehl et al. 2007 , Lu and Bostel 2007 , Sahyouni et al. 2007 , Srivastava 2008 ) focuses on designing a reverse logistics network when product returns are valuable. Nagurney and Toyasaki (2005) study the design of e-waste networks, considering a competitive market for e-waste recycling. However, these papers do not investigate the efficient design and operation of collective recycling networks within the context of environmental regulation. We contribute to this literature by (i) explicitly modeling practical issues in designing and implementing recycling networks when this activity is costly and carried out because of EPR legislation, and (ii) identifying cost allocation mechanisms that guarantee voluntary participation of producers and thus efficient collective EPR implementations. Cooperative game theory has been widely applied in operations management literature; one prominent application is to analyze profit sharing in supply chain alliances with resource sharing (see Nagarajan and Sošić 2008 for a survey). However, most of these papers focus on traditional supply chain problems and do not discuss product recovery issues. One paper that studies recycling activities is Tian et al. (2011) . The authors investigate the structure of coalitions that would emerge given an exogenous unit recycling cost that is charged to each member of a coalition and that depends on the size and product diversity of the coalition; this cost structure defines an implicit cost allocation. In this paper, we endogenously determine a coalition's total cost by solving a network flow problem which captures the cost heterogeneity and the network synergies, and focus on developing cost allocations that promote participation in the collective system.
From a methodological perspective, we also contribute to the literature on cooperative network games (e.g., Kalai and Zemel 1982a ,b, Granot and Granot 1992 , Derks and Kuipers 1997 , Owen 1975 , Samet and Zemel 1984 , to name a few). A classical result in this area is that a dual-based cost allocation is guaranteed to be in the core. Ease of implementation, on the other hand, favors the use of simple proportional allocations. This is the case in the EPR context, where return share is prevalent. Thus, an important practical consideration for the cost allocation problem under collective EPR is identifying a set of core allocations that can be presented as derived from the return share concept. In this work, we show that adjustments to the return share model can achieve a core cost allocations under very general conditions. More importantly, we characterize the adjustments that matter, i.e., weighing return shares by cost burden and critical resource usage.
Collective EPR implementations often involve using both producers' independent capacities and those contracted by the system operator. By studying such a system as a cooperative network game, we also introduce a new perspective on the use of a mixture of player-owned and exogenous resources in collaboration. Existing analyses of such games (e.g., the pseudo-flow game introduced by Kalai and Zemel 1982a and the simple flow game studied in Reijnierse et al. 1996) assume that the exogenous capacity is a public resource that is available free of charge, and show that the core of such games can be empty under certain conditions. Granot (1994) analyzes an extended linear production game where anyone may purchase the exogenous capacity in bundles, and gives bundle prices to guarantee the existence of the core. We extend this stream of research by studying a hybrid model in §4.4.2, where the exogenous capacity is operator-contracted and thus accessible at no additional cost to the operator-run grand coalition, while independent sub-coalitions are allowed access to an arbitrary fraction of it for an additional (non-member) fee. Such user differentiation reflects the policy in some EPR bills under which capacity shortfalls in independent CRNs can be complemented by operator-contracted capacity at a surcharge. We derive lower bounds for the unit access fees under which the core must exist. 
Model Description
In this section, we first introduce the notation and structure of the collection and recycling network (CRN) that represents the practice of e-waste collection and recycling. We then compute the minimum total operating cost that can be achieved in a CRN. Finally, we formulate a cooperative game model based on which we mathematically define the notion of a group incentive compatible cost allocation that will guarantee the attainment of this minimum cost.
Network Model Formulation
A typical collection and recycling system of e-waste consists of four components: collection, consolidation, transportation and processing (dismantling, shredding, and/or recycling). We model the operations of such a system as a multicommodity network (Figure 1 ), called the collection and recycling network (CRN), where a variety of post-use products from different producers are handled.
Figure 1
The structure of a generic collection and recycling network.
The Network: To formulate a CRN, we construct three sets of nodes: L = {j : j is a collection point}, C = {n : n is a consolidator}, and R = {r : r is a processor}. We denote the set of all edges as E. To represent capacity restrictions at each entity as edge capacities, we duplicate node sets L, C and R by generating L = {j : j is a collection point}, C = {n : n is a consolidator} and R = {r : r is a processor}, and link each original node with its counterpart in the duplicated sets. The capacities at collector j, consolidator n and processor r are then modeled as edge capacities on edges (j, j ), (n, n ) and (r, r ), respectively. Transportation capacities on edges between any pair of nodes (u, v) in L and C, and in C and R are modeled by a set of parallel edges E uv , where each edge corresponds to a different transporter.
Products, Costs, and Legal Requirement: We denote a producer by i and the set of producers by M . Every producer i makes the set of products Π i ; these sets are mutually exclusive with each other. The set of all products is denoted by Π = i Π i . On each edge e, the corresponding entity incurs an operational cost c π e to collect, transport or process a unit of product π. Moreover, each processor r also pays a downstream cost σ We use d π j to denote the waste volume (by weight) of product π at collection point j, i.e., the amount of product π brought to j by the consumers. These waste volumes determine a producer's legal obligations given a mandated recycling requirement, modeled by the parameter τ , which is the minimum fraction of the return volume of each product that should be recycled during the entire collection and recycling process (including all downstream stages). Since landfilling mainly occurs after the processing/downstream recycling stage, and is outside the boundary of the CRN that is relevant for cost allocation purposes, we capture the influence of the stringency of such a requirement by modeling c well as where the resulting parts and materials are sent. For example, when the mandated recycling requirement is stringent, the processors should not only refrain from direct landfilling, but also contract with downstream recyclers that are able to thoroughly recycle the lead and the glass obtained from CRT TVs/monitors, both of which increase the processing costs.
Capacities: Producers can privately own or contract for collection, transportation and processing capacities, called their independent capacity. We denote the CRN formed with the independent capacity of producer i by N i , where each edge e has k i e amount of independent capacity available. There is a system operator whose role is to establish a collective CRN that includes the independent capacities of those producers who are willing to join it and that collects and processes their e-waste, as well as that of producers with no independent capacity. The operator can also contract for additional capacity, which we call operator-contracted capacity, up to a limit of K p e on edge e, so as to supplement the independent capacity brought by the producers who join the collective CRN. We assume that independent capacities are reported truthfully to the operator; in practice, verification of capacities is feasible through a certification process (e.g., in Washington the Department of Ecology certifies collectors, transporters and processors.)
Minimum Total System Cost: Let N denote the network obtained by pooling all independent and operator-contracted capacity together. Because it includes all available resources, the total cost to collect and process all the producers' products will be minimized on N . Given a certain stringency level τ , this minimum total cost can be computed by a minimum cost flow problem defined on N , which we call the centralized problem (C).
nonnegativity constraints .
In the above program, (2) represents flow conservation constraints at every node except for the source and terminal nodes, (3) guarantees that all collected units are processed, and (4) represents the capacity constraint on every edge in N . The variable listed beside each constraint is its corresponding dual variable. The objective function (1) minimizes the total cost incurred by the flow in the entire network N under the mandated recycling requirement τ . The optimal solution to (C) is denoted by f * , which we call the socially optimal routing. Note that the implementation of f * requires operator-contracted capacity to be used on edge e at the level of k
Thus, an equivalent formulation of (C) can be obtained by replacing K p e with k p e .
In conclusion, Z(f * ) represents the optimal system cost that can be achieved given τ . However, to attain Z(f * ) requires the formation of the collective network N by pooling all independent and operator-contracted capacity so that f * can be implemented by the system operator. This is not guaranteed to happen. The problem is that individual producers or sub-coalitions can be better off by not joining the centrally-operated system if the cost allocated to them under the centrallyoperated system is above their stand-alone costs. Thus, modeling the perspectives of individual producers is an important part of the problem, which is discussed next.
A Cooperative Game on CRNs.
In this section, we formulate a cooperative game on the CRNs, called the collection and recycling flow (CRF) game. In this game, individual producers are assumed to have two options: (i) join the centrally-operated CRN or (ii) form and operate an independent CRN individually or in a sub-coalition.
In option (i), it is the system operator that oversees and coordinates the e-waste flow of the participating producers using the independent capacities of those producers and additional operatorcontracted capacity, if needed. Specifically, independent and operator-contracted capacity availabilities and unit prices are collected by the system operator. The return volumes are observed, routed optimally by the operator, and processed. The operator is billed by the collectors, transporters and processors based on the volumes they handled, at the unit prices previously communicated.
Note that in this model, the unit cost of using independent capacity is assumed to be unchanged when integrated into the centrally-operated CRN under the same mandated recycling requirement τ . The participating producers pay the portion of the total cost in this CRN that is allocated to them by the operator according to the cost allocation mechanism in force. Such an amount is often determined ex-post in practice. For example, under the return share mechanism, both the total cost and producers' return shares are observed/calculated after the products are processed, which are then used to determine the amounts to be billed to producers.
In option (ii), producers process their products in a sub-coalition, using only the independent capacities belonging to that sub-coalition. We call the network associated with such a coalition an independent CRN. Capacity within an independent CRN is restricted to the usage of the corresponding sub-coalition members. Moreover, in this main model, we assume that sub-coalitions cannot access operator-contracted capacity; this assumption is relaxed in §4.4.2, where we allow sub-coalitions operating their independent CRNs to pay a fee to use operator-contracted capacity.
When all producers choose to join the centrally-operated CRN, the centrally-operated grand coalition is formed. If not, a fragmented system is created, which consists of the centrally-operated CRN and independent CRNs of defecting sub-coalitions. Mathematically, we define the value of the centrally-operated grand coalition, v(M ), to be the minimum total system cost on network N (that includes the operator-contracted capacities), i.e., Z(f * ). The value of sub-coalition S M in a CRF game, v(S), is defined as the minimum total cost achievable on the corresponding independent CRN, and can be computed by a program (C S ) that can be interpreted as the centralized problem within S. (C S ) differs from (C) in that (i) the product set is restricted to Π S = i∈S Π i , and (ii)
sub-coalitions can only use their independent capacities, i.e., constraint (4) is replaced with
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Based on this CRF game model, we define a cost allocation by
, all cost is allocated. In the context of our problem, the central question in allocating the costs is to prevent defection of producers (i.e., having them choose option (i)). The notion of the core of the CRF game (Gillies 1959 ) provides a good solution to this problem: An allocation x provides incentives for the participation of all producers in the collective system if i∈S x i ≤ v(S) ∀S M , i.e., no sub-coalition of producers is allocated a higher cost within the centrally-operated grand coalition compared to operating their independent CRNs. In this paper,
we refer to such cost allocations as being group incentive compatible.
Designing Group Incentive Compatible Cost Allocations
We first analyze the cost allocation by return share and identify its shortcomings. Based on this analysis, we construct an allocation mechanism that is obtained by making adjustments to return share and is guaranteed to be a core allocation of the CRF game. This mechanism is called costcorrected return share with capacity rewards ( §4.2). We then identify an alternative mechanism (return share with capacity rewards) that does not require cost adjustments while guaranteeing group incentive compatibility under mild conditions ( §4.3). We conclude with a discussion and analysis of practical concerns: economies of scale ( §4.4.1) and non-member access fees ( §4.4.2).
Cost Allocation by Return Share
A producer's return share is defined as the ratio of the producer's products returned to the total amount of electronic products returned by weight (E-Cycle Washington 2010). For notational simplicity, we denote the return volume belonging to sub-coalition S as R S . = j∈L π∈Π S d π j , and let R . = i∈M R i be the total volume of products returned. We assume R i > 0 ∀i ∈ M . The cost allocation by return share, x r , is defined such that the cost allocated to producer i is computed as
Note thatv
can be interpreted as a flat rate charge equal to the average cost within the centrally-operated grand coalition. Letv
R S be the average cost within a sub-coalition S M operating an independent CRN. We can evaluate the maximum cost increase experienced by a sub-coalition S M compared with its stand-alone cost v(S) under the allocation by return share.
We call this measure the incentive compatibility gap of the allocation and denote it by G(x r ), where
The last term in (8) indicates that the incentive compatibility gap can be interpreted as the maximum increase in the average unit cost that a sub-coalition S will experience when joining the 13 grand coalition multiplied by its return volume over all S ⊆ M . The change in the average unit cost for S,v M −v S , is influenced by network synergies. Intuitively, a sub-coalition of producers who make cheaper-to-recycle electronics and has established an efficient collection and recycling infrastructure with sufficient capacity tends to have a smaller average unit cost when operating its independent CRN, and thus is more likely to suffer a cost increase from joining the grand coalition when cost is allocated by return share. This intuition is substantiated by our following analysis on the network conditions for the allocation by return share to be in the core of the CRF game. First, we present a general sufficient condition in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Given a CRN, x r is in the core of the CRF game if (i) for any edge e ∈ E and any processor r ∈ R, the operational cost and net processing cost of all products are identical,
i.e., c π e = c e andĉ π r =ĉ r ∀π ∈ Π; (ii) for each product π, its return share is the same at all collection points and is equal to its return share in the entire CRN, i.e.
is equal ∀j ∈ L; and (iii) the socially optimal routing f * can be implemented without operator-contracted capacity, i.e.,
Proof: All proofs are presented in Appendix A.1.
Under the sufficient conditions presented in Proposition 1, the CRN is entirely homogeneous and essentially uncapacitated with respect to independent capacities. These sufficient conditions are very restrictive and generally not satisfied in practice. Hence, further analysis is needed regarding the stringency of the necessary conditions to ensure group incentive compatibility of return share.
Since developing insightful necessary conditions is very hard in a general network setting, in this analysis we consider a special case of the general CRN, denoted by CRN 2 (Figure 2 ), and focus on the impact of the heterogeneity in processing costs and capacity.
Figure 2 An equivalent network structure of CRN2
In CRN 2 , there are two producers A and B who have products π A and π B with return volume d
and d π B , respectively. They have independent processing resources r A and r B , respectively, with
Without loss of generality, let r A be more efficient than r B such that both products are processed more cheaply at r A , i.e.,ĉ
. Proposition 2
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characterizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the allocation by return share to be in the core.
Proposition 2. Consider CRN 2 as defined above. Whenĉ
, x r is in the core of the CRF game if and only if (i) there is sufficient capacity at processor r A to process both products, i.e.,
, and (ii) the unit processing costs of both products at processor r A are identical,
i.e.,ĉ
, there exist two constants ∆ and∆ such that x r is in the core of the CRF game if and only if the difference between the unit processing costs of product π A and π B at processor r A satisfies ∆ ≤ĉ
Proposition 2 indicates that even under a two-producer setting, return share is not group incentive compatible unless under very restrictive conditions. Whenĉ
, producer A has both the more efficient capacity and the product that is cheaper to recycle. Thus, in order to ensure his participation in the collective system under return share, the average cost in the collective system should equalĉ
. This is essentially equivalent to all products being recycled at the same cost under the optimal routing, which requires a homogeneous and uncapacitated CRN. This condition becomes less stringent in the case whereĉ
, i.e., where the producers are complementary as they either contribute a cheaper-to-recycle product or an efficient processor to the collective system. In this case, a certain degree of cost heterogeneity between the products is allowed given it is confined to a certain range [∆,∆] that essentially reflects a balance between the cost burden and the capacity contributions of the two producers (see Appendix A.1 for the detailed formulae of ∆ and∆).
The above observations provide insights regarding the factors that drive the incentive compatibility gap of the allocation by return share in general, namely, cost heterogeneity and independent capacity contribution. Accounting for those factors helps us identify the right ingredients for designing a cost allocation model based on return share that is in the core, as illustrated in the next section.
A Cost Allocation in the Core: Cost-corrected Return Share with Capacity Rewards
The adjustments we propose to cost allocation by return share account for the differences among producers regarding their cost burdens and their differences in capacity usage versus contribution.
First, recall that v * π , β * π j and α * e denote the dual optimal solutions of the centralized problem (C) with respect to the constraints (2) -(4). Hence, we can interpret the term β * π j as the marginal cost to process one additional unit of product π returned to collection point j in the centrally-operated grand coalition, which captures the network synergies under a cost-minimization objective due to the requirement that all e-waste returned is to be processed. We weigh the return volumes of
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products at each collection point by their marginal costs to obtain a cost-corrected return share for each producer i, denoted by µ i :
Second, let p e denote the unit reward price on edge e. Then producer i receives a total capacity reward equal to e∈E p e k i e , i.e., producers are compensated for their independent capacity contributions to the grand coalition according to a set of unit reward prices on the edges of the CRN.
These monetary rewards increase the total cost to be allocated to v(M ) + i∈M e∈E p e k i e . Consider the following allocation, denoted by x p µ :
We call this allocation method cost-corrected return share with capacity rewards and prove that it guarantees group incentive compatibility.
Theorem 1. Given any CRN, ∃ capacity reward prices p e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E such that x p µ is in the core of the CRF game.
Theorem 1 is a strong result showing that simple but powerful adjustments to return share can guarantee a core allocation. The proof proceeds as follows: When µ i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ M (i.e., all producers exert a nonnegative cost burden on the system), it can be shown that if the capacity reward price p e is set equal to |α * e | ∀e ∈ E, x p µ resides in the set of dual-based allocations, and therefore, according to Theorem 2 in Granot (1986) , must be contained in the core of the CRF game. The situation becomes more complicated when there exists a large heterogeneity in product costs and some producer i makes a net revenue contribution to the system (i.e., µ i < 0). In that case, the above capacity reward prices p e = |α * e | cannot guarantee a core allocation if operator-contracted capacity exists, but we show constructively that a set of prices based on {|α * e |} can be found that results in an allocation equivalent to a dual-based allocation.
The practical value of this mechanism is that it can be presented as an allocation based on the return share notion with adjustments for operational costs and independent capacity contributions.
To illustrate how Theorem 1 would be implemented, consider the simple example presented in §1, for which the optimal dual solution is , and set capacity rewards p r 1 = 1 and p r 2 = 0 (only capacity at r 1 , i.e., only producer A, is rewarded). By formula (10), the total cost v(M ) = $5 should be allocated
· (5 + 1 · 2) = 3, which is clearly a core allocation.
An Alternative Cost Allocation Model
In this subsection, we exploit the underlying network structure to develop an alternative model that can generate a core allocation by only focusing on capacity rewards. Consider the following cost allocation model (return share with capacity rewards, x p r ), which uses simple return shares instead of cost-corrected return shares compared to formula (10):
It is easy to see that when the capacity reward prices p e on all edges are set to zero, this model would be equivalent to the return share model. Hence, to what degree capacity rewards can reduce the incentive compatibility gap of the allocation by return share and whether this model can guarantee a core allocation depends on how the {p e } are chosen. For example, in the simple example of §1, we can set p r 1 = 2, p r 2 = 0 and thus obtain the core allocation (
· (5 + 2 · 2) = $3. However, it is not straightforward whether a core allocation can be achieved in general.
To explore this issue further, letk
denote the ratio of the independent capacity availability on edge e to the total return volume of producers in S, i.e., the normalized independent capacity of S. We can then define the incentive compatibility gap of x p r given reward prices {p e } similarly as that for the allocation by return share, and obtain
The last term in (12) allows us to observe that the effectiveness of capacity rewards largely depends on the value ofk S e −k M e , which measures the difference between the normalized independent capacity in S and in the grand coalition M . A critical observation is that only sub-coalitions withk S e >k M e on at least one edge can potentially benefit from such a capacity reward. Hence, intuitively, we can expect the capacity rewarding mechanism to be effective in reducing the incentive compatibility gap of return share when the average independent capacity availability in the grand coalition is low. This is indeed shown to be the case: We prove (see Theorem 3 in the Appendix) the existence of a set of unit capacity reward prices {p e } under which the allocation (11) is guaranteed to be in the core of the CRF game when the independent capacity in the CRN is insufficient to process the entire return volume under mild conditions (see Appendix A.2 for a detailed technical analysis).
The practical value of this finding is that under certain circumstances, the widely-adopted return share calculation can be retained and group incentive compatibility be guaranteed by a simple capacity rewarding mechanism, without resorting to cost-based adjustments. In other words, cost heterogeneity among different producers' products can be reflected in the cost allocation mechanism through simple capacity rewards.
Extensions
We close this section by extending our results in two practically important directions: incorporating economies of scale and non-member access fees.
4.4.1. Economies of Scale. Economies of scale is one of the frequently mentioned advantages (and the reason for the popularity of) collective implementations of EPR. To gain insight into the impact of economies of scale on the group incentive compatibility of cost allocations, we consider a model where a global discount (increment) factor that is a function of the total return volume handled in the network is applied to the unit operational or downstream cost (unit downstream revenue) over the entire CRN; this ensures tractability while capturing the essence of economies of scale. The discount and the increment factors are modeled respectively as a decreasing function η ∈ (0, 1] and an increasing function ζ ∈ [1, ∞) in the total return volume. In particular, we denote the factors associated with a sub-coalition S by η S . = η(R S ) and ζ S . = ζ(R S ) respectively. We let the operational cost of product π on each edge e be η S · c we denote its optimal objective function value by v (η,ζ) (S). We define the core of the CRF game under scale economies and the incentive compatibility gap of an arbitrary allocation in this setting accordingly.
We calculate the three cost allocations x
in formulas (7) and (11), and by adjusting both v(M ) and r,r ) , where f * is the socially optimal routing, denote the total processing revenue obtained within the grand coalition under no scale economies. Define v r (S) in the same way for each sub-coalition S M with adequate independent capacity to fulfill the recycling obligation of its members (i.e., v(S) < ∞).
Proposition 3. Given scale economies parameters η and ζ that decrease and increase respectively with respect to the total return volume in the CRN,
is in the core of the CRF game under scale economies;
2. In the case where ∀π ∈ Π, ρ
R S | holds, i.e., the average processing revenue obtained within S is no higher than that within the grand coalition under scale economies, then the incentive compatibility gaps G(x
Thus, according to the first result of Proposition 3, cost-corrected return share with capacity rewards continues to guarantee an allocation in the core of the CRF game under scale economies.
Now consider the models of return share and return share with capacity rewards. When the conditions in the second result of Proposition 3 are met, economies of scale can reduce the incentive compatibility gap of both models by at least a fraction of (1 − η M ). This is because all producers can enjoy a percentage cost saving of (1 − η M ) within the centrally-operated grand coalition under the return-share based cost allocations, which is no less than their economies of scale benefits under smaller sub-coalitions in a fragmented system in this case. Otherwise, the effect of scale economies becomes more complex and scale can even lead to an increased incentive compatibility gap. We analyze this effect by studying CRN 2 defined in §4.1 under return share, and focusing on the case
In particular, we assume that π A creates a positive unit processing revenue ρ and zero downstream cost at both processors, while π B has no processing revenue but exerts a downstream cost σ 
There exists a constantρ such that G(x (η,ζ) r ) > G(x r ) if the unit processing revenue ρ ≥ρ.
Intuitively, the condition
indicates that producer A incurs a bigger loss in average revenue from participating in the collective system after scale economies are factored in.
In other words, the revenue component of the incentive compatibility gap is increased by scale economies. When the unit revenue ρ is large enough, such an increase dominates the reduction in the cost component of the gap due to scale economies; the thresholdρ reflects the relative magnitude of the two effects. This intuition can be used to explain the potential effect of scale economies to increase the incentive compatibility gap in general CRNs: When
R S |, the sub-coalition S experiences a loss in average recycling revenue participating in the grand coalition, which contributes to the incentive compatibility gap of the allocation by return share. Since such a revenue component of the incentive compatibility gap is affected differently by scale economies (through ζ) than that derived from cost (through η), a larger incentive compatibility gap may occur when scale economies are factored in. Note that such a situation can only occur when processing revenues associated with different products/processors vary widely. The practical implication of these observations is that in the presence of revenue heterogeneity among products or processors, economies of scale may not be as effective in reducing the incentive compatibility gap as has been advocated (Shao and Lee 2009), particularly if a cost allocation mechanism that is not group incentive compatible, such as return share, is used. In other words, the scale advantage of collective systems may be undermined by the prevalent return share model. 4.4.2. Non-member Access Fees. Some EPR bills are designed with flexibility provisions so that a capacity shortfall in an independent CRN can be complemented by the system operator using available operator-contracted capacity at a surcharge. For example, in Washington, a sub-coalition operating an independent CRN will be charged a unit shortfall fee by the system operator for the amount that it fails to process compared to its mandated share of the total return volume collected.
Such a unit fee often covers the operational and downstream cost to handle the missing part of the sub-coalition's obligation within the centrally-operated CRN plus a surcharge. This policy is essentially equivalent to allowing sub-coalitions that operate independent CRNs to use operatorcontracted capacity for supplementing their independent capacities at a surcharge. We call these surcharges non-member access fees. We show that when non-member access fees are incorporated into the CRF game, the allocation by cost-corrected return share with capacity rewards remains in the core under properly designed non-member access fees.
Let the unit non-member access fee for operator-contracted capacity on edge e be φ e . We construct a CRF game with {φ e } by modifying the program (C S ) in §3.2 that computes the value of a sub-coalition S M as follows: (i) add the term e∈E φ e · max{0; π∈Π S f π e − i∈S k i e } to the objective function to account for the total amount of non-member access fees paid for operatorcontracted capacity; and (ii) increase the right-hand side of the capacity constraint on each edge e by the amount of operator-contracted capacity, i.e., k p e . Define the optimal value of this modified program as the value of sub-coalition S with non-member access fees {φ e }, denoted by v φ (S). One important feature of this CRF game under non-member access fee is the user differentiation of the operator-contracted capacity: Producers need to pay to use the operator-contracted capacity only if they defect from the collective system. Hence, this game essentially combines features of existing cooperative games in literature that assume for all players and coalitions, the exogenous capacity not owned by players is available either for free (e.g., the pseudo-flow game by Kalai and Zemel 1982a) or at a price (e.g., the extended linear production game by Granot 1994) .
In the following, we analyze the choices of {φ e } such that cost-corrected return share with capacity rewards continues to guarantee an allocation in the core. To build intuition, we first observe that when φ e = ∞ ∀e ∈ N , sub-coalitions operating independent CRNs in a fragmented system will only use their own independent capacities. In this case, the CRF game with nonmember access fees is equivalent to the original one described in §3.2 and thus x p µ must be in the core by Theorem 1. The opposite extreme case occurs when φ e = 0 ∀e ∈ N , resulting in a special case of the pseudo-flow game, which is not guaranteed to have a non-empty core (Kalai and Zemel 1982a) . Our analysis finds a threshold for {φ e } in closed-form expressions, such that all values of φ e above this threshold guarantee that x p µ resides in the core of the CRF game with non-member access fees. Moreover, the threshold characterizes how the impact of incorporating non-member Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. access fees into the game model is related to the cost heterogeneity in the CRN and producers' capacity ownership conditions. In presenting the result, we use e 0 to denote an edge in the CRN where independent capacity exists, i.e., i∈M k i e 0 > 0.
Theorem 2. Given any CRN, ∃ capacity reward prices p e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E such that x p µ is guaranteed to be in the core of the CRF game under non-member access fees {φ e } if
2. φ e ≥ min e 0 ∈E:
Theorem 2 implies that non-member fees can be effectively utilized to induce participation in a collective system. Notice that the lower bounds given as the right-hand-side in the above formulas will be smaller if the cost-corrected return shares (µ i 's) or the percentage independent capacity ownerships (
's) are similar among the producers. In fact, they attain their lowest value if
The practical implication of this observation is that it requires lower non-member access fees to guarantee a core allocation under the model of cost-corrected return share with capacity rewards if there is a higher level of homogeneity in cost/revenue among products and in the independent capacity ownerships among producers. whose job is to create a state-wide, collective "standard plan" to process the allowable e-waste (TVs, monitors, computers, and laptops) brought to its collection points by the consumers. The
Implications for Practice
Authority contracts with those collectors, transporters and processors approved by the Department of Ecology; centrally manages the routing of all e-waste flows; pays the collectors, transporters and processors; and allocates the total operational and administrative cost of these activities to producers participating in the standard plan based on return share. The bill also allowed producers to opt out of the standard plan (subject to Department of Ecology approval) and operate their own collection and recycling networks. As mentioned in the introduction, two such independent plans were filed in 2009 by two producers groups who believed their stand-alone costs would
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be lower than their cost allocation under the standard plan. Although these plans were rejected on the grounds that they were not sufficiently developed, they are expected to be resubmitted (Electronic Manufacturers Recycling Management Company 2011), as the adjustments made by the Authority to the return share model based on market share have not fully addressed their concerns. Consequently, a fragmented state-wide recycling system in the state of Washington is a real possibility, and our proposed cost allocation mechanism can serve to resolve these issues as follows: The system operator (WMMFA) would communicate the cost allocation mechanism to be used. Since independent capacities are subject to verification prior to approval of the plan by the Department of Ecology, the WMMFA has access to this information. After returns are observed, the WMMFA would incorporate this independent capacity information in calculating the optimal routing of e-waste flows, determine the cost-corrections and the reward prices based on this routing, and in turn, the cost to be allocated to each producer. Ex-post, producers would be able to verify that their allocation is superior to what they would have achieved on their own, giving them the incentive to stay with the WMMFA-operated collective system.
To demonstrate how our proposed solution can be implemented in the Washington example and its potential economic implications, we construct a highly representative version of the Washington state collection and recycling network, including a sample of fifty collection points, eight consolidation points, eight processors, and seventeen producers who produce two product categories (TV/monitors and computers) with a waste volume equal to the entire 2009 volume in
Washington. The detailed construction of the sample CRN is provided in Appendix B. The distinction between TVs/monitors and computers reflects the primary difference in processing costs and post-use values of products at present. Specifically, TVs/monitors are expensive to process due to the hazardous materials contained in them, while computers generate revenues for processors as their components and/or materials have high reuse value. The example also captures the processor heterogeneity in WA by distinguishing between high-tech and low-tech processors, as well as TV/monitor-specialized and IT-specialized ones. We adopt a processing cost structure for each product at each processor based on disguised but structurally representative estimates (Table 1) . Motivated by the existing independent recycling capacity of producers around the WA region and the independent plans submitted in WA, we model two producers as having access to independent CRNs. Specifically, we consider a TV producer A and a computer producer B who have access to high-tech independent recycling capacities at two out-of-state high-tech processors that are modeled to be specialized in recycling TVs/monitors and IT products (e.g., computers), respectively. Processing capacity contracted by the Authority at in-state processors is also incorporated in the sample CRN. Collection and transportation are assumed to be uncapacitated for Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. simplicity of exposition. In experiments not reported here, we observed similar network synergies as discussed below when such capacities were included.
In this case study, both return share with capacity rewards and cost-corrected return share with capacity rewards generate a core allocation. With the cost-corrected return share with capacity rewards model, the cost correction adjusts A's return share upward and B's downwards. This is because producer A makes TVs, while producer B's return volume consists mainly of computers, which generate recycling revenue and exert a much smaller cost burden on the system than TVs.
We also observe that the cost-corrected return share of producer B can even be negative, as the recycling revenue from computers can dominate the operational costs. With a cost correction, only the TV/monitor specialized capacity brought in by producer A commands a capacity reward.
Without a cost correction, only producer B gets a capacity reward for the IT specialized capacity it brings in. This is due to the different roles cost correction can play: A is penalized by the cost correction and thus may end up with too high a cost without a capacity reward, while B is rewarded and the reward from the cost correction is enough to account for both its capacity contribution and the processing revenues of its products. This highlights the significant interaction between capacity reward prices and cost corrections, and the nuances in the implementation of the proposed mechanisms. In addition, the non-member access fees to be charged at the local processors (where capacity is centrally contracted) that ensure a core allocation under the cost-corrected return share model with capacity rewards can be shown to have a lower bound of 26-30 cents/lb depending on the stringency of the recycling requirement. This implies that the 50 cents/lb shortfall fee currently charged in Washington (Electronics TakeBack Coalition 2011) would help motivate producers' participation in the collective system even under a flexibility provision.
We next investigate the economic advantages of the proposed solution compared to the return share model. In the following, the "centrally-operated grand coalition" refers to all producers participating in the standard plan, whereas the "fragmented system" refers to the one where producers A and/or B do not. In either case, the "system cost" includes the cost generated by the collection, transportation and processing of all the producers' e-waste. The "efficiency loss" refers to the increase in the system cost after the grand coalition disintegrates into a fragmented system.
In Washington, the incentive compatibility gap of the cost allocation by return share, and the associated efficiency loss from fragmentation, are substantial. Based on our sample CRN, return share is not group incentive compatible regardless of the stringency of the mandated recycling requirement τ ; at worst (when τ = 1), producer B is allocated about $0.6M more within the centrally-operated grand coalition, which is almost 60% more than what it could achieve on its own. This is because the cost allocated to producer B according to its return share reflects neither the value of B's independent capacity in reducing the total operating cost within the grand coalition, nor the much smaller cost burden (even a positive revenue) associated with computers, which are dominant in B's waste stream. Thus, B has an incentive to defect. While A alone would not defect, if B defects, A also finds it preferable to do so provided the A-B subcoalition adopts a core allocation within themselves. This would result in a 4.5-6.5% efficiency loss relative to the system cost of the grand coalition, due to the reduction in network synergies in a fragmented system. It represents a lower bound on the real efficiency loss as it is calculated under no economies of scale. A revealing property of the efficiency loss in this example is its non-monotonicity with respect to τ (see Figure 3 , which plots the absolute efficiency loss). This phenomenon derives from the change in cost heterogeneity in the CRN and the consequent network synergies as the recycling requirement becomes more stringent. Specifically, there is a change in the relative cost saving from rerouting product flow from a local low-tech processor to a high-tech one between TVs/monitors and computers when τ reaches 0.5. This gives rise to a change in the optimal flow pattern: In the fragmented system, it is optimal to process the computer volume of producers other than A and B at the local high-tech (low-tech) processors when τ is below (above) 0.5. Therefore, how e-waste flows are rerouted relative to this baseline when a centrally-operated grand coalition is formed changes with τ , yielding a non-monotone efficiency loss function. Another way to see this is to Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no.
note that network synergies depend not only on the absolute magnitude of costs, but also on their relative values. Hence, while one expects the efficiency loss to increase as τ rises, the reverse may be observed. This discussion highlights the strong influence of network synergies in determining the implications of legislative choices.
We now turn to the effect of scale economies. We model the discount factor η S of a coalition S as a convex quadratic decreasing function of R S (the parameters of the function are calculated based on input from WMMFA; see Appendix B for details); the increment ζ is assumed to be 1 for any return volume. We find that in this case study, the presence of economies of scale reduces the incentive compatibility gap of the allocation by return share (yet cannot guarantee a core allocation), and can greatly accentuate the efficiency loss from fragmentation. Note that proponents of collective systems tend to fall back on the economies of scale argument when faced with criticisms regarding the issues such as over-charging and potential system fragmentation. Our analysis underlines that economies of scale may not be sufficient to ensure group incentive compatibility of return share and thus voluntary participation of all producers in a collective system. The resulting efficiency loss from fragmentation can reach about $1.42M (equivalent to a 20% increase in system cost) when τ = 1, which is more than four times that without scale economies (about $0.35M). We conclude that scale makes it all the more important to resolve incentive compatibility issues as it multiplies the efficiency loss that results from fragmentation.
Collectively, these observations highlight the significant incentive compatibility gaps and potential efficiency losses that can be incurred in practical implementations, and the difficulty in predicting their sensitivity with respect to legislative choices and system characteristics. They also underline why finding a group incentive compatible cost allocation is so important from an economic perspective.
Finally, we also note that implementing the optimal routing and calculating the proposed cost allocations requires counting and separation (by product type and producer) at collection points.
In practice, e-waste is often routed to the processors without separation and return shares are calculated by sampling. Thus, the CRN gains by avoiding the separation cost, but it loses from not routing the e-waste optimally through the CRN. Moreover, a group incentive compatible cost allocation as proposed here cannot be implemented. In the rest of this section, we investigate the value of source separation in the Washington example. To this end, we develop a "myopic routing"
policy inspired by the current practice in Washington (as opposed to the "optimal routing") where the e-waste is shipped to the processors without separation based on the transportation cost on each edge so as to minimize the total consolidation and transportation cost subject to capacity constraints at each processor. Sampling is carried out at each processor so as to achieve a desired accuracy level, based on which the total processing cost is calculated (please refer to Appendix B.4 Figure 4 Percentage difference in the centralized system's total cost (including separation or sampling cost) between the myopic policy and the optimal policy, and the incentive compatibility gap under the myopic policy.
(a) Efficiency difference (b) Group incentive compatibility gap under the myopic policy for the detailed specification of the myopic policy). We incorporate new elements that influence the operating cost under the myopic routing policy in the Washington example. Specifically, we include a separation cost and a sampling cost. We model product heterogeneity as the fraction p of the TVs in the total volume; a p value close to 0.5 means a higher heterogeneity level.
Our analysis shows that the myopic routing has an advantage over the optimal one in terms of the total cost only under a high cost difference between separation and sampling, and a low level of product heterogeneity. However, such an advantage may not be realized as the allocation by return share is generally not group incentive compatible under the myopic routing. Specifically, Figure   5 (a) compares the centralized CRN's cost under the optimal routing with source separation and the myopic routing. A big difference between the cost of separation and sampling makes it relatively too expensive to implement the optimal routing. Moreover, a lower level of product heterogeneity requires a smaller sample size to achieve the desired sampling precision and thus further reduces the cost of the myopic policy. Note that the Washington instance is essentially a special case of the numerical example used in this section with p=70% (see Appendix B.4 for details), and for this particular instance, the myopic policy dominates the optimal one. This implies that from the WMMFA perspective, whose objective is to minimize the overall system cost, the myopic policy will be preferred. An important caveat is in order, however: The centralized cost of the myopic policy can only be achieved if return share produces a core allocation, since return share is the only cost allocation that can be implemented with sampling at the processors. We find return share has a positive incentive compatibility gap for the entire range of the difference between the unit separation cost and sampling cost values ( Figure 5(b) ). Therefore, although the myopic routing Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no.
with return share may seem attractive because it saves on separation cost, it will continue to raise over-charging concerns that may culminate in a fragmented system in Washington.
A critical driver of the status quo, where separation is economically not preferable, is that the current composition of e-waste flows is dominated by mainly CRT TVs. This results in a lower sample size requirement and a lower total sampling cost. Presumably, the e-waste composition will change in the near future, and will consist of a variety of different TV sets (e.g., fewer CRTs and more LCDs with Hg backlights, LCDs without Hg backlights and LEDs) and more IT products.
The increased product heterogeneity would require larger sample sizes, and more variation in the value and processing requirements would increase the attractiveness of source separation. Indeed, our analysis suggests that the optimal policy with source separation would be highly justified as long as the per unit separation cost is modest (not more than 2 cents higher than the unit sampling cost at p = 50%). With technological improvements yielding higher RFID read rates and lower tag costs (Hickey et al. 2012 ), this appears to be feasible in the near future. In other words, our analysis suggests that centralized systems such as the WMMFA should seriously consider the potential from separation at source, both in terms of overall cost efficiency and a group incentive compatible cost allocation.
Conclusions
In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing debate regarding how to implement EPR legislation in an effective and efficient manner. The choice in practice is often framed as one between an efficient collective system where producers share a lower total cost, and an individual system, where a producer is only responsible for its own cost, but is unable to benefit from network synergies. In this paper, we propose an alternative paradigm that is capable of resolving this dilemma. The resolution we propose is based on the observation that the active debate is not necessarily critical of collective systems per se, but rather of the concerns regarding the prevalent proportional cost allocation methods used in these systems. Accordingly, we focus on identifying group incentive compatible adjustments to the return share method, which is prevalent in practice due to its simplicity. We first show that the cost allocation by return share is generally not group incentive compatible due to its inability to account for processing cost heterogeneity among products or for network synergies that arise in the CRN. Then, we show that these shortcomings can be alleviated by simple adjustments such as correcting return shares to account for differences in processing costs, and rewarding independent capacities according to the value they bring to the collective CRN.
These results can influence the practice of EPR, as already evidenced by their adoption as policy input for the revision of the WEEE Directive in the UK (IPR Working Group 2012). They can also help different stakeholders shape their EPR implementation strategies. For example, producers lobbying for bills and regulations that reflect their cost burdens more accurately can focus their efforts on promoting these two easy-to-communicate concepts. Similarly, state or producer-operated systems who aim to achieve scale economies by drawing as many producers as possible to their system can implement these concepts. As we show, scale by itself is not a guarantor of stability for collective systems, and can even exacerbate their incentive compatibility gap, so these notions continue to be valuable for any size organization. Finally, collective systems who wish to institute flexibility provisions can institute non-member access fees developed here and maintain group incentive compatibility in cost allocation.
The producer dynamics in the state of Washington provide the opportunity to apply the concepts we develop and to assess their practical significance. To capture the producer behavior observed in Washington, we consider a setting where two producers are proposing to set up independent CRNs. We illustrate how the proposed cost allocation models can be implemented in this state. Our findings suggest that these cost allocation models, by guaranteeing group incentive compatibility, can retain these producers in the state-wide collective system and result in efficiency improvement of 5 -20% for the state of Washington, which translates to $0.45M -$1.8M of opportunity cost.
With a simple population-based projection of this scenario-based analysis to the United States, this cost efficiency improvement would amount to approximately $22M -$90M for the electronics industry. Note also that this projection is based on the 5.78 lbs/capita collection rate in Washington, which is much lower than its European counterpart that reaches 17.6 lbs/capita because of its broader scope (Eurostat 2009 ). If similar collection volumes are attained (e.g. via scope expansion) in the US, the predicted efficiency improvement by a group incentive compatible cost allocation can go up to $67M -$274M for the electronics industry. Moreover, if fragmentation results in fewer processors being involved in each component of the fragmented system, processor competition may soften. In this case, our calculation of the efficiency loss would provide a conservative estimate of the true loss. More importantly, projecting the sales volume in Washington to the sales volume in the United States, we find that the collective system with cost allocation by return share could charge producers A and B up to $30M more than their actual cost burdens. While this is a casebased analysis, it underlines the economic potential of achieving collective system implementation and group incentive compatible cost allocation. The analysis also highlights the sensitivity of the outcomes with respect to legislative choices and network characteristics.
Implementing group incentive compatible cost allocations requires source separation, which can be a costly activity. Nevertheless, our analysis of the WA state data suggests that collective systems should seriously consider finding efficient ways of source separation, especially in the face of high Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no.
product heterogeneity. This appears to be economically feasible: the Japanese implementations of EPR (Tojo 2004) show that separation can be achieved at low cost by a simple barcode technology.
An important policy goal of EPR is to make producers internalize the end-of-life burden of their products and encourage them to design better products. While our focus in this paper is cost efficiency given an existing set of products, it is interesting to investigate whether the cost allocations we develop are effective in providing design incentives. Preliminary analysis shows that cost-corrected return share with capacity rewards can give producers a higher return on their design investment than if they were to operate independently. This occurs when producers' design improvements positively impact network synergies; otherwise, this cost allocation may give producers a lower design incentive. This observation indicates a strong connection between individual design incentives, efficiency and group incentive compatibility under the same cost allocation.
Understanding the interactions among these three dimensions in designing a cost allocation, and developing mechanisms that provably increase design investments is an interesting direction for future research.
Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. Proof of Proposition 1. According to Granot (1986) , the following dual-based cost allocation is guaranteed to be in the core of the CRF game.
where ν i e ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ M ∀e ∈ E, and i∈M ν i e = k p e ∀e ∈ E. According to conditions (i) and (iii) in Proposition 1, β * π j are identical for all π given any j ∈ L and α * e = 0 ∀e ∈ E. Hence
The last equality holds due to condition (ii) that for each product π,
is identical for all collection points j. Hence, if we denote
Hence, x r is equivalent to the dual-based allocation defined in (13).
Proof of Proposition 2
We first prove the result whenĉ
The average cost incurred when A operates alone isv
. Hence by equation (7), if x r is in the core, the minimum average cost within the
is the smallest unit processing cost on CRN 2 , thusĉ π A r A ≤v M . Therefore, we conclude that x r being a core allocation indicates
, which requires that all products are processed at r A andĉ
. On the other hand, when there is sufficient capacity at r A to process all products andĉ
, and x r must be in the core according to equation (7).
, we consider four scenarios and calculate the minimum average costv M respectively. We first define the following notation that represents the unit processing cost difference at the two processors for each product: δ
. =ĉ
scenario 1 where there are sufficient capacity at processor r A , i.e.,
scenario 3 where
The minimum average cost within the grand coalition in each scenario is calculated as below.
By equation (7), the allocation by return share is in the core of the CRF game if and only ifv
. By solving these two inequalities in each scenario withv M replaced by the corresponding Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no.
formula in (16), we obtain the following sufficient and necessary condition for the allocation by return share to be in the core.
Hence, we can prove the proposition whenĉ
by defining ∆ and∆ as the lower and upper bounds specified in (17) in each scenario.
Proof of Theorem 1. We discuss two cases to prove this theorem. Note that in our problem, the dual variables β π j are unrestricted while α e ≤ 0 ∀e ∈ E. In addition, since we assume sufficient public capacity is available, the centralized problem (C) is feasible and obviously lower bounded (e.g., by zero). Thus strong duality must hold for (C).
Case 1
When
e ) due to strong duality for (C), we conclude that v(M ) + e∈E p e i∈M k i e = j∈L π∈Π
. Thus by formula (10),
Hence, x p µ is equivalent to the cost allocation x ν d defined in (13) if we set ν i e = µ i k p e ∀e ∈ E ∀i ∈ M . With µ i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ M in this case, ν i e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E ∀i ∈ M . Hence, this cost allocation is a dual-based cost allocation, and thus is in the core of the CRF game.
Case 2 When ∃i ∈ M such that µ i < 0, we show that any set of prices {p e } that satisfy the following conditions give rise to an allocation x p µ in the core of the CRF game.
To show this, consider an arbitrary sub-coalition S ⊂ M . Due to strong duality and condition (19b),
Then by formula (10), the cost allocated to S satisfies
The inequality ≤ 1 is due to condition (19a). The second one ≤ 2 is due to the fact that [β * , α * ] is a feasible dual solution to the centralized problem within S, i.e., (C S ), and weak duality. Hence, by definition, the allocation x p µ is in the core of the CRF game.
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We then show that there exist prices that satisfy condition (19). Pick one edge e 0 such that i∈M k i e 0 > 0 (such an edge always exists otherwise no producer can operate alone). Define a set of reward prices such that
It is easy to verify that such a set of prices satisfies both conditions specified in (19). In fact, when these prices are adopted, we can calculate that the cost allocation to producer i equals
Hence the cost allocation x p µ is equivalent to a dual-based cost allocation x 
Case II:
Proof of Lemma 2. We first model the problem (C 
nonnegativity constraints ,
where [υ, β, α, ω, σ] are the dual variables associated with the constraints in (C
Define the set E j = {(j, j ), ∀j ∈ L}, and E r = {(r, r ), ∀r ∈ R. Then the dual to the above linear program is formulated as follows:
We define a solution to the above program (D S φ ) based on the optimal dual solutions to the centralized
Due to the optimality of [υ * π v , α * e , β * π j ] with respect to the dual problem of (C), it is easy to check that the solution defined in (43)- (45) is feasible for (D S φ ) under the condition given in the theorem. Hence by weak duality, we conclude that the objective value of (D S φ ) for the above solution, which is exactly the cost allocated to sub-coalition S under the dual-based allocation x ν d , is no greater than v φ (S) ∀S M . Hence, the dual-based allocation x ν d lies in the core of the CRF game with non-member access fee φ e . Continuing the proof of Theorem 2, it is easy to see that it directly follows from Lemma 2, because according to the proof to Theorem 1, we can design prices {p e } such that x r µ is equivalent to a dual-based allocation. In particular, in Case 1 (i.e., when µ i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N ), according to (18), we can see that by adopting the prices p e = |α * e | ∀e ∈ E, a dual-based allocation is obtained with ν ∀e ∈ E ∀i ∈ M . Hence, by choosing e 0 to be the edge such that the value of max i∈M {(1 −
)} is minimized, we obtain the second bound given in Theorem 2.
A.2. Group Incentive Compatibility of the Allocation by Return Share with Capacity Rewards
In §4.3, one critical observation is that the capacity rewarding mechanism can be effective in reducing the incentive compatibility gap of return share when the average independent capacity availability in the grand coalition is low. To analyze this observation, we assume for the rest of this section that the collective independent capacity contracted by all producers is insufficient to process the total volume of products returned, necessitating additional operator-contracted capacity. We analyze the factors limiting the maximum throughput in the network i∈M N i (i.e., the grand coalition network without operator-contracted capacity)
as follows. We first transform the CRN into a capacitated single-commodity network by adding an artificial origin node o that is linked to each of the collection points j via a fictitious edge (o, j) with a capacity equal to π d π j , the total return volume at j. We also add an artificial destination node d and connect every node r ∈ R to d with an infinite capacity edge. Let the resulting network be called N 
Theorem 3. Assume the minimum cutC is unique. If K E(C) < R and E(C) ∩ {(o, j), j ∈ L} = ∅, indicating that the throughput of i∈M N i is not restricted by the return volumes at the collection points, then G(x p r ) = 0, i.e., ∃ capacity reward prices p e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E such that return share with capacity rewards generates an allocation in the core of the CRF game.
Proof of Theorem 3. First, recall that by Lemma 1, the smallest incentive compatibility gap under the model of return share with capacity rewards, G(x p r ), can be calculated as the optimal value of an linear program (26)-(29). Since E(C)∩{(o, j), j ∈ L} = ∅, K E(C) = e∈E(C) i∈M k i e < R. Hence, adding up the constraints (27) over the set E(C), we obtain another constraint S∈Ψ e∈E(C)
Ψ such that v(S) < ∞, subset S has enough independent capacity to process its own return volume in its private CRN, and e∈E(C) i∈S k
, as the first (second) term is greater than or equal to (strictly less than) 1. Due to the nonnegativity constraints on y S , we conclude that the only feasible solution to the program (26)- (28) is the zero vector and thus G(x p r ) = 0 due to Lemma 1. The intuition behind this result is the following: The condition K E(C) < R implies an inadequate independent capacity availability within the grand coalition M on the edges in the minimum cut set. Hence, for any sub-coalition S that has sufficient independent capacity to operate its own independent CRN,k S e >k M e on at least one edge in E(C). Since we assume E(C) ∩ {(o, j), j ∈ L} = ∅, this edge must be in the original CRN and we can associate a capacity reward with it. According to our analysis to formula (12) in §4.3, this fact guarantees that the capacity rewarding mechanism potentially can benefit all sub-coalitions that are likely Gui et al.: Efficient Implementation of Collective EPR Legislation Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. 39 to break away. In other words, there exists a set of nonnegative reward prices {p e } that can adjust return share to be incentive compatible. Note that Theorem 3 can also be extended to cases where the min-cut is not unique (see the supplement document).
Also note that under the conditions in Theorem 3 and assuming the minimum cutC is unique, an additional unit returned to any collection point j cannot increase the maximum throughput of i∈M N i since E(C) ∩ {(o, j), j ∈ L} = ∅. This indicates that the volume burdens of products on i∈M N i are not differentiated.
Such homogeneity is essential to the group incentive compatibility of return share with capacity rewards, as Theorem 3 may not hold when it is violated. In that case, we show in this section that the group incentive compatibility of the allocation can still be guaranteed by further adjusting producers' return shares based on the relative volume burdens of their products.
o is in the cut set E(C), indicating that increasing the volume returned to this collection point j by one unit will increase the maximum throughput in N d o when the min-cut is unique. LetL
points that collect more products than they can process through the network i∈M N i . The volume burdens of products returned to the collection points inL and in L\L are differentiated according to their capacity usage in the centrally-operated grand coalition. In particular, it can be shown that processing the products returned to the collection points in L \L does not take up any capacity on the edges in E(C) \ {(o, j), j ∈ L}. In other words, the independent capacity shortage in the grand coalition is caused entirely by the products collected atL. Let R 
The above allocation is identical to (11) except for the proportions used to allocate the total cost, i.e., 
we conclude
The theorem can then be derived by summing up the modified inequalities (27) over all edges in E(C) \ {(o, j), j ∈ L} and following the same argument in the proof of Theorem 3.
It can be observed that Theorem 3 is essentially a special case of Theorem 4 in which
When such homogeneity no longer exists, Theorem 4 indicates that weighted corrections of producers' return shares that are proportional to the relative volume burden of their own products can adjust for the network synergies arising in a centrally-operated CRN with low independent capacity availability. Hence, when the total cost is allocated based on such proportions, the capacity reward mechanism remains effective in reducing the incentive compatibility gap of return share even when the gap is due to the cost differences among products. Note that this is only guaranteed when the return volume within any sub-coalition S ⊆ M results in a nonnegative cost burden, i.e., v(S) ≥ 0. The reason is that the mechanism essentially penalizes volume burden and rewards capacity contribution; yet whenL = L, it may be that the participation of some producer neither exerts any volume burden nor alleviates capacity shortage in the grand coalition, yet it reduces the total cost due to the high processing revenue obtained from its products. In this case, volume-corrected return share with capacity rewards is not sufficient to produce a group incentive compatible allocation.
Hence, we conclude that while the volume correction improves the group incentive compatibility of the allocation by return share with capacity rewards, the differentiation among products is derived based on their volume burdens, which does not explicitly and fully capture the network synergies arising from the heterogeneous operational and downstream costs in the CRN, in particular when processing revenue is involved. Furthermore, in cases with adequate independent capacity to process the entire return volume in the grand coalition, the volume-corrected return share becomes undefined asRL = 0. In these situations, a cost-correction to the return shares of producers may be necessary to guarantee group incentive compatibility of the allocation. The sample contains at least one collection point for every county and is generated according to Table 2 . In Table 2 The number of collection points chosen in each county.
Number of collection points registered Number of collection points chosen 1-5 1 6-19 2 ≥ 20 3 counties where more than one collection point is to be chosen, we select one in each of the largest cities by population. In case no collection point is registered in such a city, we pick the one that is the nearest to it.
The resulting sample is displayed in Table 3 .
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transportation distances between entities in the sample CRN are measured by the minimum traveling time in order to account for the differences in road conditions. 
B.2. Products, Return Volumes and Capacity
The EPR bill in Washington covers TVs, computers, laptops and monitors (WMMFA 2010). Based on their processing costs, the products are basically classified into CRT-TV/monitor (which is reported to account for 98.5% of the total TV/monitor return volume in WA), LCD-TV/monitor, desktops, laptops and computers, because these are the only cost drivers with the current processing technology. In particular, TVs/monitors contain hazardous materials and thus are costly to recycle under certain environmental standards, while the parts and materials used in computers have high reuse value and usually generate a revenue in recycling.
Hence, we distinguish in the example two product types, TVs/monitors and computers. A total volume of 38,509,563 lbs of products, among which about 30% are computers and 70% are TVs/monitors, were collected in Washington in 2009 in the form of 137 different product brands from 87 producers with return shares varying from 0.001% to 7.9% (E-Cycle Washington 2009). In constructing the sample CRN, we uniformly choose a set of 19 products (labeled from π 1 to π 19 ), manufactured by 17 producers (labeled from m 1 to m 17 ) from the pool to capture the heterogeneity of the actual return shares in the Washington implementation.
The products are also chosen in order to reflect the 7:3 proportion of TVs/monitors vs computers in the total volume. We then calculate the volume of each of the 19 products in the example proportional to their relative return shares based on the actual collection volume of 38,509,563 lbs (Table 5 ).
In order to distribute the collective return volume of the 19 products shown in Table 5 among individual collection points, we first calculate the total amount collected in each of the collection points in the sample CRN. Specifically, if only one collection point is chosen in a county, then we assume that the entire volume within this particular county is returned to this collection point. Otherwise, the county volumes are proportionally allocated among the sampled collection points based on the corresponding city populations. Based on this data, we calculate each collection point's share of the total volume by λ j = collective volume returned to collection point j 38,509,563
. Then, the volume of each product π at each collection point j is calculated based on a homogeneous distribution of the product's total volume among the collection points that follows {λ j , j = 1, 2..., 50}, i.e., d π j = λ j · return volume of π shown in Table 5 . The unit costs in the sample CRN are disguised but structurally representative of costs in WA that are reported as aggregate averages within each stage of the CRN for a product type. All unit prices are in cents per weight (lb) except for the transportation cost, which is in cents per pound hour (lb×hr).
We assume no administrative cost in the sample CRN, as this cost is negligible in Washington. For each product type, the unit price for collection and consolidation is assumed to be identical at each such site (10 cents/lb), while different processing cost structures are quoted by different processors (see Table 6 for details).
The unit downstream recycling cost (revenue) used in this example is a weighted average over all parts and materials according to their proportions by weight inside one unit of the corresponding product. Hence, given the mandated recycling requirement τ , the net processing cost is calculated as a linear approximation as follows: For TVs/monitors, the net processing cost equals operational cost + τ · downstream recycling cost +
(1 − τ )· landfilling cost, while that for computers is simply operational cost + downstream revenue, because 100% recycling will be implemented for computers regardless of τ due to the potential processing revenues. The transportation rates are reported to be based on the geographic location of the route. Specifically, all processors in WA are located along the north-south corridor between Seattle and Vancouver (which is referred to as the "west-of-the-mountain-area"). Many common carriers operate busy routes along this north-south corridor and thus can provide cheap back-haul miles for the collection points within the area. In contrast,
the transportation services for collection points located "east of the mountain" are more expensive. Hence, in our example, we use two different rates for the collection points sampled in these two areas (0.8 and 2
cents/lb×hr). The calculation is done based on a 2 cents/lb average and the assumption that the return volume at each collection point is distributed to the 8 processors according to the aggregate percentages reported by WMMFA (2010) , and that the cost in the "west-of-the-mountain-area" is about 50% cheaper than that in the east.
As for our modeling of economies of scale in the example, our interviews indicated that a 20% cost reduction can be expected in Washington when the total volume doubles. According to this information, we calculate a decreasing quadratic function η(x) such that η(38, 509, 563) = 1 and η(38, 509, 563 * 2) = 0.8, which produces the function 0.011146 · ( 
B.4. The Myopic Policy in Studying the Value of Source Separation
In this section, we develop the myopic policy used for the numerical analysis to study the value of source separation of products at the collection points. The assumption behind the myopic policy is that the e-waste volumes at collection centers are not separated by brand. In other words, the distribution of individual producers' e-waste volumes are not known at the point of collection. Rather, the total volume at each collection point j, d j = π∈Π d π j is the only available volume information. Because separating each producer's products at collection can be costly for high return volumes and a heterogeneous mixture of products, the myopic policy estimates the mixture of individual producers' return shares by sampling at the processors. This set-up is similar to many practical settings. Sampling typically takes place at processors, because return volumes from different collection points are consolidated there, which increases the statistical significance of the sampling procedure. This myopic policy can be cost effective if sampling costs in practice are significantly smaller than separation costs. Because sampling requires the handling of only a fraction of the waste volume, the return share calculation can be achieved at a very low cost under this policy.
To highlight the above effects, for the rest of the discussion, we assume an identical unit processing cost among all products on every edge of the CRN except at the processors (which is exactly the case in the sample CRN used in the numerical study). Because the myopic policy does not assume that the actual mixture of TVs/monitors and computers at collection points is readily available, the network flow problem cannot be solved optimally. Rather, the system operator needs to transport the e-waste volumes to the processors using a suboptimal procedure. We model this myopic procedure as follows: First the e-waste is routed to the processors to minimize the total collection, consolidation and transportation cost, which can be solved by the following program. 
